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Abstract 
In this study, we developed a route choice model that considered travel time reliability and traffic impediments, 
including traffic accidents. Based on evolutionary game theory, we designed the model to identify a route that a 
dispatcher chooses when considering changes in daily route travel times and traffic impediments using measured 
data. Evolutionary game theory is a game theory formulated using dynamics, and it analyses the distribution and 
change of a combination of strategies. A model from Roth & Erev (1995), which was taken as a representative of 
models that assumed trial and error learning, was used. 
Using the model designed for this study, we conducted two case studies. The first case study reduced the standard 
deviation of some routes to 3/4 of the original value , and the second case study reduced the charge of a toll road by 
half. As a result, the combination of route choice strategies changed significantly. 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 7th 
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1. Introduction  
With the development of just-in-time shipping, logistics companies cannot afford delays in shipping 
consignments to their destinations. Therefore, logistics companies plan the shipping time to include 
additional time, considering variability of average travel time due to traffic congestion and traffic 
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accidents. Freight traffic requires strict correspondence for the variability of travel time compared to 
passenger traffic.  
In previous studies, some models have analysed route choice behaviour for daily variability of travel 
time or unexpected events. However, few studies have modelled route choice behaviour considering both 
daily variability and unexpected events. 
Therefore, in this study, we developed a route choice model that considered travel time reliability and 
traffic impediments, including traffic accidents. Based on evolutionary game theory, we designed the 
model to identify a route that a dispatcher chooses when considering changes in daily route travel times 
and traffic impediments using measured data. The data was collected from 579 delivery trucks from four 
logistics companies, through a probe investigation during one month. 
2. Model  
2.1. Outline of model 
In a related model based on game theory, Bell (2004) modelled an action of risk aversion from traffic 
impediments, such as traffic accidents, as a game between a dispatcher and a devil that causes 
impediments on links. 
The present study was based on the study of Bell (2004), and we applied evolutionary game theory and 
developed a model in which a dispatcher considers the influence of the variability of travel time on the 
route choice .  
Generally, when and where an accident occurs is unknown. In other words, information necessary for a 
look-ahead method is not available. For this reason, we felt that the assumption of a look-ahead in game 
theory was too strong. 
Without a look-ahead game theory, the evolutionary game theory assumes that increase or decrease of 
strategic share depends on whether a particular strategy succeeded or not. The model adapts well to 
represent a phenomenon by applying evolutionary game theory. 
Many models exist within evolutionary game theory. In this study, the dispatcher was assumed to 
decide on a route choice considering past experience, and a model of trial and error learning was applied. 
If a player performs trial and error learning, a player only requires two things: choice of actions and 
criteria to evaluate the results of actions.  A player does not need to know the perspective when a player 
makes a certain choice and does not need to know other player’s strategy. Furthermore, a player does not 
need to know the other player’s results of action and gain. Trial and error learning is a versatile algorithm 
that can be applied without this information. 
A model of Roth & Erev (1995) given as a representative of a model that assumed trial and error 
learning was applied. A player updates their tendency of choice at time t+1, adding reinforcement that is 
given as a result of choice at time t to the tendency at time t. As a result of the game, the player’s choice 
is converted into a certain share. 
 
1. Setting of players: 
Based on Bell’s study, the players are a dispatcher and a devil that causes traffic impediments. 
Player 1: A dispatcher (A freight carrier)  
Player 2: A devil that causes traffic impediments (traffic accidents) 
 
2. Strategy of players: 
Player 1 was assumed to choose a minimum-generalized-cost route and player 2 was assumed to cause 
a traffic impediment on a single link. 
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Strategy of player 1: choose a route with minimum costs among N routes 
Strategy of player 2: cause a traffic impediment on a single link among M links 
 
3. Model flow: 
Strategy share of player 1 is determined by the following steps. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Model flow 
In the following sections, the calculations for each step shown in the Model flow are defined. 
 
4. Determination of the travel time for all routes without impediments: 
Travel time of route j at time t is calculated by the average travel time and standard deviation of the 
route. The travel time is calculated by the box Muller method and assigned stochastically on the 
assumption that the distribution of travel time follows a normal distribution.  
Determination of travel time for all routes without impediments: Tj(t) 
˄generate random number according to normal distribution˅ 
Calculation of travel time including additional time caused by impediments: Tjk(t) MhN pattern 
(N is number of routes that the dispatcher chose, M is number of links that the daemon chose.) 
Calculation of each route’s costs for each strategy of daemon: ACjk(t) 
MhN pattern 
Calculation of each route’s reinforcement values for each strategy of daemon: R1jk(t) 
Calculation of expectation reinforcement value for all routes: R1k(t) 
Calculation of inclination of time t+1: p1k(t+1) 
Probability that daemon causes an accident 
on route j at time t: P2j(t+1) 
Update of route choice probability of dispatcher: P1k(t+1) 
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where,  Tj(t):   Travel time of route j, at time t 
u1, u2:   Uniform random numbers 
Vj:   Standard deviation of travel time of route j  
Pj:   Average travel time of route j  
The average travel time of each route and standard deviation of travel time are calculated by the 
following equations. Additionally, the average travel time of each road section and the standard deviation 
of travel time are given by the probe investigation data.  
The average travel time of route j is 
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The standard deviation of the travel times of route j is 
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where,   Pi:   Average travel time of road section i  Vi:   Standard deviation of road section i  
COV(Xi,Xl):  Covariance of the travel time of road sections i and l 
 
5. Calculation of travel time including additional time caused by impediments: 
Travel time including additional time caused by impediments is calculated for each strategy of the 
daemon. The travel time is calculated using the N×M pattern, where N is the number of routes that the 
dispatcher choose and M is the number of links that the daemon chose for impediments. 
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where,  Tjk(t):  Travel time of route j at time t where the daemon generates an impediment on link k 
Djk:  Dummy variable˄If link k is included in route j then Djk=1; if link k is not included in 
route j then Djk=0˅ 
ETk:  Additional travel time when an impediment occurred on link k 
 
6. Calculation of each route’s costs for each strategy of daemon: 
Each route’s costs are calculated for each strategy of daemon. The N×M pattern for travel time is 
calculated. 
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where, TCjk(t), RCjk(t), Tj(t), Djk: Travel-time cost, vehicle-operating cost, road toll, and dummy 
variable of route j at time t where the daemon causes an impediment 
on link k.  
   α, β:  Parameters (parameters are determined based on situations of the 
actual route choice.)  
 
7. Calculation of each route’s reinforcement values for each strategy of daemon: 
Each route reinforcement value is calculated for each strategy of daemon. The N×M pattern for travel 
time is calculated. 
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where,    rjk(t):  Gain by choosing route j at time t where the daemon causes an impediment on 
link k
TCb, RCb:  Travel-time cost and vehicle-operating cost by base travel time 
 
8. Calculation of the expectation reinforcement value for all routes: 
An expectation reinforcement value for each route is calculated by the weight of strategy probability of 
the daemon. 
 
㺌
1
211 ))()(()(
m
k
kjkj tptRtR
 
u                                                                                                            (8) 
 
where,  )(2 tp k :   Probability that the daemon causes an accident on link k. 
 
9. Calculation of inclination of time t+1: 
The inclination at time t+1 is calculated by substituting an expectation reinforcement value in 
following equation. The reinforcement value of player 1, which is a component of the tendency to choose 
route j at time t+1, was assumed to be given by the gain at time t. The reinforcement value was 
determined as follows. 
 
)()()-1()1( 111 tRtptp jjj   I                                                                                                      (9) 
 
where,  )(1 tp j :    Tendency that player 1 adopts route j at time t 
)(1 tR j :   Reinforcement given for )(1 tp j  at time t 
I :   A parameter to express the speed of the oblivion (0<I <1) 
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10. Update of route choice probability of the dispatcher: 
The probability of selecting route j is calculated by the inclination of each route. 
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11. Probability of the impediments (strategies of daemon): 
We assumed that impediments occur with a fixed probability on each link. The probability is based on 
the traffic accident rate available from statistics.  
2.2. Iterative calculation 
The reinforcement value, inclination, and route choice probability of time t are updated by a 
calculation result, and the same operations are iterated. 
3. Application of model 
For shipping scenarios from Toyota to Tahara and Toyota to Tobishima, and from 7 am to 10 am and 7 
pm to 10 pm, four situations were applied to the model. The parameters α and β of Equation (5) were 
changed, and their approximate model result for route choice share was calibrated to be the actual route 
choice share.  
3.1. Routes 
Six routes were selected for both Toyota-Tahara and Toyota-Tobishima shipping scenarios based on 
actual shipping routes. 
 
1. Toyota-Tahara  
Route 1: Highway route (Toyokawa-Bridge, Kosakai-Bypass)  
Route 2: Highway route (Toyokawa Bridge)  
Route 3: Highway route (Detours Toyokawa-Bridge)  
Route 4: Highway route (Detours Toyokawa-Bridge)  
Route 5: Highway route (Toyokawa-Bridge)  
Route 6: Motorway route 
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Fig. 2. Toyota-Tahara routes 
2. Toyota-Tobishima 
Route 1: Highway route 
Route 2: Motorway route (Meiko-chuo IC –Tobishima IC) (Motorway travel is shortest) 
Route 3: Motorway route (Toyota-minami IC –Tobishima IC) (Motorway travel is longest) 
Route 4: Highway route 
Route 5: Motorway route (Toyoake IC –Tobishima IC) (Motorway travel is second longest) 
Route 6: Motorway route (Nagoya-minami IC –Tobishima IC) (Motorway travel is third longest) 
 
 
6QOGK'ZRTGUUYC[
-QUCMCKD[RCUU
6Q[QVCEKV[
6CJCTCEKV[
1MC\CMK
6Q[QJCUJK
EKV[
)COCIQTK
6Q[QMCYC$TKFIG
 
1VQJCICOCIQTK+%
6Q[QVCJKICUJK+%
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Fig. 3. Toyota-Tobishima routes 
3.2. Travel time of routes 
1. Toyota-Tahara 
The values for both average travel time and standard deviation are shortest on Route 6, which uses the 
motorway. The average travel time and the standard deviation of Route 1 are short. The differences 
between Routes 1 and 6 are great for the 7–10 am scenario, but are minimal for the 7–10 pm scenario. In 
addition, the standard deviation of the 7–10 pm scenario hardly exhibits a difference between each route. 
Route 4 
Route 5 
Route 6 
Route 1 
Route 2 
Route 3 
 6Q[QVCEKV[
6QDKUJKOC
XKNNCIG 6Q[QVCOKPCOK+%
6Q[QCMG+%
/GKMQEJWQ+%
0CIQ[COKPCOK+%
 6Q[QVCEKV[
6QDKUJKOC
XKNNCIG 6Q[QVCOKPCOK+%
6Q[QCMG+%
/GKMQEJWQ+%
0CIQ[COKPCOK+%
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Table 1. Average travel time and standard deviation (Toyota-Tahara) 
㪛㫀㫊㫋㪸㫅㪺㪼
䋨㫂㫄㪀
㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㩷㫋㫀㫄㪼
㩿㫄㫀㫅㫌㫋㪼㫊㪀
㪪㫋㪸㫅㪻㪸㫉㪻㩷㪻㪼㫍㫀㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫆㪽
㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㩷㫋㫀㫄㪼㩷㩿㫄㫀㫅㫌㫋㪼㫊㪀
㪈㪉㪎㪅㪋 㪎㪅㪍
㪈㪇㪍㪅㪇 㪌㪅㪋
㪈㪊㪉㪅㪎 㪏㪅㪏
㪈㪇㪍㪅㪏 㪌㪅㪊
㪈㪌㪉㪅㪉 㪈㪈㪅㪍
㪈㪉㪈㪅㪋 㪌㪅㪋
㪈㪊㪉㪅㪏 㪎㪅㪎
㪈㪈㪎㪅㪊 㪌㪅㪊
㪈㪊㪐㪅㪊 㪏㪅㪇
㪈㪈㪌㪅㪍 㪌㪅㪌
㪈㪇㪈㪅㪏 㪎㪅㪉
㪏㪊㪅㪍 㪌㪅㪈
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪍㪉㪅㪊
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍 㪍㪉㪅㪐
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪌㪐㪅㪌
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪍㪋㪅㪏
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪍㪇㪅㪇
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪍㪇㪅㪌
 
 
2. Toyota-Tobishima 
For the 7–10 am scenario, the average travel time and standard deviation of Route 3 are shortest, and 
those of Route 2 are longest. Although the average travel time and standard deviation have similar trends 
at 7–10 pm, these are shorter than those of at 7–10 am. 
Table 2. Average travel time and standard deviation (Toyota-Tobishima) 
㪛㫀㫊㫋㪸㫅㪺㪼
䋨㫂㫄㪀
㪘㫍㪼㫉㪸㪾㪼㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㩷㫋㫀㫄㪼
㩿㫄㫀㫅㫌㫋㪼㫊㪀
㪪㫋㪸㫅㪻㪸㫉㪻㩷㪻㪼㫍㫀㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅㩷㫆㪽
㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㩷㫋㫀㫄㪼㩷㩿㫄㫀㫅㫌㫋㪼㫊㪀
㪎㪍㪅㪉 㪌㪅㪍
㪍㪋㪅㪈 㪊㪅㪎
㪏㪌㪅㪇 㪍㪅㪍
㪎㪉㪅㪊 㪌㪅㪈
㪋㪈㪅㪋 㪊㪅㪉
㪊㪎㪅㪊 㪉㪅㪎
㪎㪎㪅㪏 㪍㪅㪈
㪍㪉㪅㪉 㪋㪅㪇
㪌㪊㪅㪈 㪋㪅㪌
㪋㪋㪅㪎 㪊㪅㪈
㪌㪏㪅㪍 㪋㪅㪏
㪌㪇㪅㪌 㪋㪅㪌
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪊㪉㪅㪊
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍 㪊㪉㪅㪇
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪊㪈㪅㪎
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪊㪍㪅㪌
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪊㪎㪅㪉
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪊㪐㪅㪊
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3.3.  Result of reproduction by model simulation 
A route share estimated by model simulation was compared to an actual route share by changing the α 
and β values. As a result, the model simulation exhibited results similar to the actual route choice except 
in the case of Toyota-Tahara for 7–10 pm. 
Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 am: 
 
㪇㩼
㪉㪇㩼
㪋㪇㩼
㪍㪇㩼
㪏㪇㩼
㪈㪇㪇㩼
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍
㪪㪿
㪸㫉㪼
㩷㫆㪽
㩷㪼㪸
㪺㪿
㩷㫉㫆
㫌㫋㪼
㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫅㫋㪸㪾㪼㩷㫆㪽㩷㪸㪺㫋㫌㪸㫃㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㫀㫅㪾 㪜㫊㫋㫀㫄㪸㫋㪼㪻㩷㫉㪼㫊㫌㫃㫋㩷㪹㫐㩷㪺㫌㫉㫉㪼㫅㫋㩷㪺㫆㫅㪻㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
 
Fig. 4. Result of reproduction by model simulation (Toyota-Tahara 7–10 am) 
Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 pm: 
 
㪇㩼
㪉㪇㩼
㪋㪇㩼
㪍㪇㩼
㪏㪇㩼
㪈㪇㪇㩼
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍
㪪㪿
㪸㫉㪼
㩷㫆㪽
㩷㪼㪸
㪺㪿
㩷㫉㫆
㫌㫋
㪼
㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫅㫋㪸㪾㪼㩷㫆㪽㩷㪸㪺㫋㫌㪸㫃㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㫀㫅㪾 㪜㫊㫋㫀㫄㪸㫋㪼㪻㩷㫉㪼㫊㫌㫃㫋㩷㪹㫐㩷㪺㫌㫉㫉㪼㫅㫋㩷㪺㫆㫅㪻㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
 
Fig. 5. Result of reproduction by model simulation (Toyota-Tahara 7–10 pm) 
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Toyota-Tobishima, 7–10 am: 
 
㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪉㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪋㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪍㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪏㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍
㪪㪿
㪸㫉
㪼㩷㫆
㪽㩷㪼
㪸㪺
㪿㩷㫉
㫆㫌
㫋㪼
㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫅㫋㪸㪾㪼㩷㫆㪽㩷㪸㪺㫋㫌㪸㫃㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㫀㫅㪾 㪜㫊㫋㫀㫄㪸㫋㪼㪻㩷㫉㪼㫊㫌㫃㫋㩷㪹㫐㩷㪺㫌㫉㫉㪼㫅㫋㩷㪺㫆㫅㪻㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
 
Fig . 6. Result of reproduction by model simulation (Toyota-Tobishima 7–10 am) 
Toyota-Tobishima, 7–10 pm: 
 
㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪉㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪋㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪍㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪏㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪈㪇㪇㪅㪇㩼
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍
㪪㪿
㪸㫉
㪼㩷㫆
㪽㩷㪼
㪸㪺
㪿㩷㫉
㫆㫌
㫋㪼
㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫅㫋㪸㪾㪼㩷㫆㪽㩷㪸㪺㫋㫌㪸㫃㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㫀㫅㪾 㪜㫊㫋㫀㫄㪸㫋㪼㪻㩷㫉㪼㫊㫌㫃㫋㩷㪹㫐㩷㪺㫌㫉㫉㪼㫅㫋㩷㪺㫆㫅㪻㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
 
Fig. 7. Result of reproduction by model simulation (Toyota-Tobishima 7–10 pm) 
4. Case study 
4.1. Case 
Two case studies were conducted; the standard deviation was reduced in the first case and the toll road 
charge was discounted in the second case. The influence on the route choice due to these changes was 
estimated. 
Toyota-Tahara, Case 1: 
For the route that did not use the Toyokawa-Bridge, the variability of travel time was assumed to 
decrease due to road improvements, and the influence on the route choice share was analysed. The case 
where the standard deviation is reduced to 3/4 of the original value was estimated for Routes 3 and 4. 
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Toyota-Tahara, Case 2: 
This case reduced the toll road charge by half without changing the average travel time and the 
standard deviation. In this case, the reinforcement values of Routes 1 and 6, which use the toll road, were 
increased. 
Toyota-Tobishima, Case 1: 
For the route that uses National Highway No. 23, the variability of travel time was assumed to 
decrease due to road improvements, and the influence on the route choice share was analysed. The case 
where the standard deviation is reduced to 3/4 of the original value was estimated for Routes 1, 2, and 4. 
Toyota-Tobishima, Case 2: 
This case reduced the toll road charge by half without changing the average travel time and the 
standard deviation. In this case, the reinforcement values of Routes 2, 3, 5, and 6, which use the toll road, 
were increased. 
4.2. The result of the estimation 
Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 am: 
As a result of 1,000 iterations of Case 1, the choice share of Route 4 increased to 98% and that of 
Route 2 decreased to 2% because of the standard deviation reduction of Routes 3 and 4. 
For Case 2, the choice share of Route 1 increased to 84% and that of Route 2 decreased to 10% 
because of the toll road charge being half-price. The reinforcement values of Routes 1 and 6 increased. 
Although the toll road charge was reduced, the share of Route 6 was 0%. 
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Fig. 8. Comparison with the estimation result (Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 am) 
Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 pm 
For Case 1, the route share did not change. Because the standard deviation of each route is shorter than 
the average travel time, shortening of the standard deviation did not have a major influence on the route 
choice. For Case 2, shares of Routes 1 and 2, which used a toll road, increased. However, the increase 
was not large. 
507 Naohiro Uchiyama and Eiichi Taniguchi /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  39 ( 2012 )  495 – 509 
 
㪇㩼
㪉㪇㩼
㪋㪇㩼
㪍㪇㩼
㪏㪇㩼
㪈㪇㪇㩼
㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪈 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪉 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪊 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪋 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪌 㪩㫆㫌㫋㪼㪍
㪪㪿
㪸㫉㪼
㩷㫆
㪽㩷㪼
㪸㪺
㪿㩷
㫉㫆
㫌㫋
㪼
㪧㪼㫉㪺㪼㫅㫋㪸㪾㪼㩷㫆㪽㩷㪸㪺㫋㫌㪸㫃㩷㫋㫉㪸㫍㪼㫃㫀㫅㪾
㪜㫊㫋㫀㫄㪸㫋㪼㪻㩷㫉㪼㫊㫌㫃㫋㩷㪹㫐㩷㪺㫌㫉㫉㪼㫅㫋㩷㪺㫆㫅㪻㫀㫋㫀㫆㫅
㪚㪸㫊㪼㪈
㪚㪸㫊㪼㪉
 
Fig. 9. Comparison with the estimation result (Toyota-Tahara, 7–10 pm) 
Toyota-Tobishima, 7–10 am 
In Case 1, for Routes 1, 2, and 4, which used National Highway No. 23, the share of Route 1 increased 
to more than 90%. However, Route 2 was still not selected as a route choice. This may be due to the 
considerably longer travel time of Route 2 compared to other routes. In Case 2, Route 3, which used the 
Isewangan Expressway for the longest distance, increased to more than 80%. 
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Fig. 10. Comparison with the estimation result (Toyota-Tobishima 7–10 am) 
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Toyota-Tobishima, 7–10 pm 
For Case 1, the route choice shares of Route 3 decreased, and the route choice shares of Routes 1 and 4 
increased. Because Route 2 has a long average travel time, this route share was not selected even when 
the standard deviation was reduced. 
For Case 2, the route shares of Routes 5 and 6, which use the Isewangan Expressway, increased. 
Because the toll road became half-price and the cost difference of Routes 3 and Routes 5 and 6 decreased, 
the share of Route 5 decreased slightly. 
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Fig. 11. Comparison with the estimation result (Toyota-Tobishima 7–10 pm) 
5. Conclusion  
In this study, we employed the evolutionary game theory to develop a model that assumed a strategy 
change based on whether the strategy succeeded, after selecting a certain strategy for the shipping of 
goods. This model was designed based on the actual route choice process that a dispatcher performs, 
including the consideration of additional time and selecting a route based on past experience. The change 
in route choice behaviour was analysed with real decision-making processes using this model. 
Specifically, the road improvements having a greater influence on route choice behaviour can be found 
and the model can contribute to determining the road improvements that should take priority. 
For the model development, we assumed the logistics company to consider gain as the difference of 
the sum of the time cost, the running cost, and the toll of the road. In addition, we assumed the gain to 
reinforce the next behaviour. We designed the model to consider the distribution of travel times and the 
probability of traffic accidents, and set the parameters of the gain structure in the model based on actual 
route choice behaviour obtained from probe investigation data. As a result, we could design the model 
such that the route choice share estimated by the model was similar to the actual route choice share. 
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Table 3. Result of estimated parameters 
Resistance value of 
Toyokawa bridge 
passage :㱎
Resistance value of 
road toll :㱍
䋭
䋭
70
704.0Toyota-Tahara/ 7~10am
1.5Toyota-Tobishima / 7~10pm
1.5Toyota-Tobishima / 7~10am
1.0Toyota-Tahara/ 7~10pm
Parameter of generalized cost
Situation of model 
applications
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